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Abstract 
 
According to Dr. Tricia Bacon’s and Dr. Elizabeth Grimm Arsenault’s, “Al Qaeda and the 
Islamic State's Break: Strategic Strife or Lackluster Leadership?,” the “strategic differences 
between Al Qaeda and ISIS were not sufficient to cause the split,” the strife that ensued between 
al Nusra and ISIS caused this complex alliance to rupture.  Osama bin Laden’s effective leadership 
aligned a terrorist network that amassed rebel groups for the global jihadist cause. Unlike bin 
Laden’s elitist view to destabilize the West, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi believed the principal enemies 
of the jihadist movement were Shiites for their false interpretation of Islamic theology and Sunni 
apostates for their support of the West and corrupt Arab rulers. 
In “ISIS and al-Qaeda—What Are They Thinking? Understanding the Adversary,” Dr. 
Bernard Haykel states that the jihadi militant movements are consequential to the Sunni revivalism 
experienced in the brutalized Arab politics of domestically repressed states from Algeria to Iraq, 
with groups seeking to empower Muslims against Islam’s enemies. Haykel later describes the 
relationship between ISIS and Al Qaeda as one of contentious competition for resources. Within 
this scholarly framework, the author uniquely addresses the remaining question of whether or not, 
and under what conditions, umbrella networks: ISIS and Al Qaeda, could attempt a merger.   
To ascertain the pragmatism of a potential coalition, various alliance literature has been 
applied and methodized into three paradigms; with the first, assessing party coalitions and culture, 
the second addressing the alliance framework from a business perspective, and the third 
concentrating on partnerships and mergers. Moreover, the paper focuses on the aforementioned 
paradigms and various militant group case studies, with a lens that addresses the relational 
exchange between ISIS and Al Qaeda.  
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Introduction 
 
At its zenith, ISIS’s forces controlled a territory the size of Britain, with approximately 10 
million captives. Under encampment, captives, most notably the Yazidis of Iraq and Syria, were 
murdered and enslaved. In 2017, the Iraqi Federal Police reclaimed the city of Mosul, a major jihadi 
encampment. In early February of 2019, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) vowed to 
dismantle the remaining caliphate. With help from the U.S.-led international coalition, numerous 
war planes and mortar barrages struck the stronghold (see figure 1). Now, with the last Syrian city 
of Baghouz under siege by the SDF, optimistic citizens may be naïve enough to assume that the 
war on the global jihad is over. “While some may be tempted to celebrate what is seen as ISIS’s 
demise, the fertile soil in which ISIS grew and spread is still there.”1 With a large base of online 
followers, potential lone-wolf attackers, and militants working underground to conduct hit-and-run 
attacks and bombings in Iraq and central Syria, the fight is far from over. One question remains, 
will the caliphate’s setback be enough to reunite long-term, rivals: ISIS and Al Qaeda? 
 
Background: The Partnership’s Initial Demise 
 
In 1996, Osama bin Laden announced the first fatwa against the U.S.  A synthesis conducted 
by the RAND Corporation has highlighted that a recent “switch from hard to soft targets and from 
mass casualty to smaller, but more frequent attacks; an increased focus on the economic impact of 
                                                 
1 Wedeman, B. (2019, March 23). The ISIS caliphate has ended, but its breeding ground thrives. 
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attacks; [and] greater efficiency in the utilization of loose networks,” has characterized Al Qaeda’s 
strategy.2  Subsequent to the 9/11 attacks, Al Qaeda lost its secure base in Afghanistan under paid 
protection by the Taliban. Its senior and mid-level commanders were targeted due to increased 
security, creating a catch 22, whereby future planned ‘spectaculars’ would become unparalleled. 
As explained by Rabasa et al. in “Beyond Al-Qaeda: The Global Jihadist Movement,” Al Qaeda 
depends heavily on the subcontracting of militant groups as a de facto force multiplier, “a 
consequence of the aforementioned loss of haven and leadership—al-Qaeda has been forced to 
increasingly rely on other terrorist groups who are in some way connected to the net-work to 
conduct its attacks (Pg 38).”  
“Not only did these acts of terrorism ensure that the group continued to be viewed as both 
vibrant and relevant, they also helped to underscore an image of the network as being able to strike 
at will around the globe (Pg 39).” Under the patronage of the Taliban, Al Qaeda was provided a 
safe haven to train militants, indoctrinate them, and simultaneously conduct effective attacks. 
However, the strategic transition from an identifiable operative core to a loose network of 
subcontracted militants is in part reflective of less capable assets and infrastructure (see figure 3). 
Al Qaeda has now reverted “to other established terrorist affiliates to conduct attacks but also to 
operate in a more decentralized, cellular fashion.”3 More recently, the creation of the virtual jihad 
and various urban training camps has allowed this network to prevail, igniting a second-generation 
                                                 
2 Rabasa, Angel, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, Sara A. Daly, Heather S. Gregg, Theodore W. 
Karasik, Kevin A. O'Brien, and William Rosenau, Beyond al-Qaeda: Part 1, The Global Jihadist 
Movement. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006. 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG429.html.  
 
3 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of 
Mass Destruction [Gilmore Commission], Fourth Annual Report to the President and the 
Congress, II, Reassessing the Threat, Washington, D.C.: RAND Corporation, December 15, 
2002. Pg. 12 – 13. 
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“wave of terrorism in Morocco, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, [and] Turkey [that]… is still able to 
conduct effective attacks despite the loss of training bases in Afghanistan (Pg 43).” In addition to 
using American and European converts for their passports and undetected access through security, 
Al Qaeda has diversified its resource base beyond the financial assistance it receives from states 
within the Gulf. Apart from receiving donations from jihad’s numerous supporters, Al Qaeda also 
commits online fraud and infiltrates “charities.”  Prior to the U.S.’s international coalition against 
terrorism, Al Qaeda’s central core of senior elites would engage in years of operational planning 
for ‘spectacular’ attacks. In place of conducting these large-scale, complex ‘spectaculars’, strikes 
have become smaller and more local attempts to resuscitate the jihadi cause as part of a global 
franchise. Al Qaeda’s affiliates have enough endowment to “make operational decisions on their 
own,” employing shortened planning cycles and bombarding soft targets (Pg 60).”  
There were many similarities between ISIS and Al Qaeda, as they are now both parent 
organizations. However, it wasn’t till drastic disagreements in strategy, approach, and recruitment, 
initiated their split in the wake of 2014. It was under the mature mediation of Al Qaeda leader, 
Ayman al-Zawahiri that relations between Al Qaeda and ISIS were beneficial. Today, the two rival 
entities compete within the same network of donors, suppliers, and resources for the “soul” of the 
jihadist movement. To understand what caused this stringent divide, we must assess the 
fundamental differences in tactics between the parent organizations. Under Osama bin Laden’s 
vision, he sought to unite a network of independent, dilettante jihadist fighters with the greater goal 
of removing their foreign enemy, the United States, from the Middle Eastern region. Militant 
groups, subdued by oppressive regimes, were swept under Al Qaeda’s umbrella with a myriad of 
assets, weapons, expertise, training, and funding. However, the death of bin Laden would prove 
detrimental to the unity of this terrorist network.  
5
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At the pinnacle of the U.S.’s invasion into Iraq in 2003, bin Laden lent money to Abu Musab 
al-Zarqawi, leader of the initial Iraqi Islamic Caliphate, with hopes that he would join Al Qaeda’s 
network (see figure 2). Although initially reluctant, Zarqawi fastened to bin Laden’s network and 
formed Al Qaeda’s Iraq branch or “AQI”. From the initial phase of this partnership, there were 
immediate differences in perspectives, while Zawahiri and bin Laden focused on an anti-West 
agenda, Zarqawi saw more promise in fighting sectarian wars and Sunni Muslim apostates. In 
public, bin Laden and Zawahiri embraced this relationship but it was clear Al Qaeda had swallowed 
more than it could chew. This became evident when AQI’s violence towards Sunnis provoked their 
backlash and subsequent partnership with American ground troops. Bin Laden was advised by Al 
Qaeda spokesman, Adam Gadahn to sever its ties with AQI, “because of the group’s sectarian 
violence.”4 When the Syrian civil war broke in 2011, then-AQI leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, sent 
fighters to Syria to establish a base organization. Although AQI’s strategic move to send operations 
to Syria had revived their Iraqi jihadist movement, it ultimately prepared for their secession from 
Al Qaeda’s main leadership. In charge of connecting the then-parent and child organizations, 
Zawahiri let AQI take the reins and build its own name in Syria. When the former- AQI sect coined 
the name “Jabhat al-Nusra,” Zawahiri tried to correct the situation by claiming Al Qaeda’s 
affiliation but Baghdadi refused, causing the inevitable demise of the partnership in 2014.  
Almost overnight, Baghdadi’s forces gained significant territory in Iraq, including strategic 
access to Syria, hydroelectric dams, and lucrative oil refineries. By July of 2014, Baghdadi renamed 
his operations as the Islamic Caliphate. Perplexed, Al Qaeda member branches were declaring their 
support for ISIS but Zawahiri understood that Al Qaeda would no longer take center-stage in the 
                                                 
4 Byman, Daniel L., and Jennifer R. Williams. “ISIS vs. Al Qaeda: Jihadism's Global Civil 
War.” Brookings.edu, The Brookings Institution, 28 July 2016, www.brookings.edu/articles/isis-
vs-al-qaeda-jihadisms-global-civil-war/. 
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global jihadist movement. Primarily, Al Qaeda believed apostate killing sprees were inconclusive 
to extracting the “root cause” of the Middle Eastern problem, the U.S. Al Qaeda believed that the 
U.S.’s continued support for corrupt regimes within the Middle East, prevented the necessary 
uprisings for regime change. Essentially, while Al Qaeda focused on the “far enemy,” ISIS 
prioritized the “near enemy,” such as the Assad regime in Syria and the Abadi regime in Iraq. 
Additionally, while Al Qaeda collaborates within and outside its terrorist network, the Islamic 
Caliphate chose to spearhead its organization and remain independent. ISIS uses amateur lone-wolf 
attackers, targeted by jihadist propaganda to incentivize recruitment. While ISIS consolidates 
power through expanding territories and coalesced armies, Al Qaeda believed a caliphate was a 
long-term goal, only to be initiated with popular support. Since ISIS originated its power during 
the civil uprisings in Iraq and Syria, it takes a militaristic approach with mass forces and artillery. 
Using fear-enticed displays of public beheadings, rape, and crucifixions, ISIS terrorizes 
populations into their compliance and conversion. Keeping in mind these distinctions, it’s clear 
that Baghdadi grew tired of Al Qaeda’s slow and steady pace. Moreover, the age difference 
between the leaders of the two organizations spans the length of twenty years. In addition to 
differences in tactics, approach, and strategy, ISIS utilizes Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram to 
attract the attention of younger, distraught Muslim males. The Islamic State has become the deviant 
successor group that stemmed and evolved from Al Qaeda but ultimately changed its mission, 
utilizing brutalist militarized warfare and modern methods of recruitment. “Ideologically, the 
sectarianism it foments is worsening Shia-Sunni tension throughout the region. So the Islamic State 
is a much bigger threat to Middle Eastern stability than Al Qaeda ever was.”5 
 
                                                 
5 See previous.  
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Thesis: Addressing the Framework for Alliance 
 
According to Dr. Bernard Haykel’s, “ISIS and al-Qaeda—What Are They Thinking? 
Understanding the Adversary,” the jihadi militant movements are consequential to the Sunni 
revivalism experienced in the brutalized Arab politics of domestically repressed states from Algeria 
to Iraq, with the two groups seeking “to empower Muslims against what they describe as Islam’s 
enemies, both external and internal (Pg 71).”6 Unlike Osama bin Laden’s abstract and elitist view 
to destabilize the West, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi believed the principal enemies of the jihadist 
movement were Shiites for their false interpretation of  Islamic theology and Sunni apostates for 
their support of the West and corrupt Arab rulers. Haykel describes the relationship between ISIS 
and Al Qaeda as one of contentious competition for resources. Though the two groups initially split 
through differences in approach and “despite some ideological and operational differences, both 
Al Qaeda and ISIS tap into a deep vein of resentment, disillusionment, and disenfranchisement, 
specifically among the Sunni Arabs (Pg 72).” Haykel laments that Al Qaeda’s more elitist view on 
jihadism’s radical crusade over the West, was less relevant to Zarqawi’s Sunni followers, who were 
mobilized on the ground. Overtime, Al Qaeda’s lack of reoccurring ‘spectacular’ threats dimmed 
its extensive vision, making it “less appealing over time - the attacks of 9/11 were in a sense AQ’s 
Achilles’ heel since they could not be surpassed (Pg 76).” 
To better understand whether or not ISIS and Al Qaeda will likely re-unite, various alliance 
literature has been applied and assessed into three paradigms; with the first, assessing party 
coalitions and culture, the second addressing the alliance framework from a business perspective, 
                                                 
6 Haykel, B. (2016). ISIS and al-Qaeda—What Are They Thinking? Understanding the 
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and the third, concentrating on partnerships and mergers. According to the party coalitions and 
culture literature, ethnic groups are more likely to coalesce when they have shared cultural history 
while the business alliance framework suggests that mergers are formed through delicate 
cultivation of synergy and pragmatic power-sharing. Moreover, the partnership and merger criteria 
claims that alliances are formed when groups converge on the basis of ideology. With this 
understanding in mind, the paper assesses the various paradigms and case studies of militant groups 




Party Coalitions and Culture  
In Okamoto’s article, “Organizing across Ethnic Boundaries in the Post–Civil Rights Era: 
Asian American Panethnic Coalitions,” she discusses the creation of a pan-ethnic Asian American 
Alliance due to initial insensitive threats to Chinese Americans. Overtime, these remarks were 
marketed as a threat to all Asians, allowing for the larger goal of collective movement activity. 
This shared alliance was first used to combat the high-levels of imposing anti-Asian violence and 
sentiment. Eventually, the shared cultural history was utilized to broaden pan-ethnic Asian issues, 
forming a cross-ethnic coalition. “Cross-ethnic coalition events demonstrate that organizations 
with different interests, goals, and histories can effectively coordinate their efforts for a common 
cause (Pg 143).”7  
                                                 
7 Okamoto, D. (2010). Organizing across Ethnic Boundaries in the Post–Civil Rights Era: Asian 
American Panethnic Coalitions. In Van Dyke N. & McCammon H. (Eds.), Strategic Alliances: 
Coalition Building and Social Movements_x000B_ (pp. 143-169). University of Minnesota Press.  
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Okamoto outlines the various conditions that encourage groups to form organizational 
alliances across ethnic boundaries. The conditions include: broadening social forces, sharing racial 
ideology, influential leaders molding group interests, powerful counter-movements with restrictive 
legislation, and threats to these organizational movements. Additionally, Okamoto explains the 
“Resource Hypothesis and Competition Theory,” whereby a coalition will form only under 
noncompetitive conditions when resources are plentiful. “When racial groups are in competition 
for scarce resources, racial boundaries are heightened, and coalitions, between different Asian 
ethnic groups should be more likely (Pg 150).” To test this hypothesis, Okamoto uses a data set of 
393 collective action events involving Asian-Americans in thirty metropolitan areas from 1970 to 
1998. The author defines a cross-ethnic coalition as a “coordination of efforts between two or more 
organizations that serve different ethnic populations in the Asian American community (Pg 151).”  
In relaying Okamoto’s research to this paper’s aforementioned thesis, her “Resource 
Hypothesis and Competition Theory” are instrumental in setting the groundwork for Al Qaeda and 
ISIS’s alliance and competition framework. According to Okamoto, coalition-building occurs 
when resources are plentiful in competitive conditions. If this is correct, ISIS’s current setbacks 
and loss of its caliphate could level the ‘playing field’ for a coalitional occurrence between the two 
rival organizations.  
 
Business Alliances 
According to Wiklund’s and Shepherd’s article, entitled, “The Effectiveness of Alliances 
and Acquisitions: The Role of Resource Combination Activities,” the potential value of an alliance 
or acquisition that combines resources “depends on the ability of the firm to discover and conduct 
10
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productive resource combinations (Pg 193).”8 The authors list examples wherein, the alliance or 
acquisition was short-lived or less profitable than first assumed. One such example includes the 
strategic alliance between Apple and IBM in 1992 to create a joint operating system, called 
Taligent. Despite intentions of success, the alliance dissolved after failed attempts to merge. 
“Examples of alliances and acquisitions that fail to deliver on the intended synergies are mounting, 
yet they are vigorously pursued by companies around the globe (Denrell, Fang, & Winter, 2003).”9 
Not only do firms differ in their resource portfolios but they vary in their ability to achieve the 
synergistic benefits of bundling resources. “The value creating potential of the resource portfolio 
increases when the resources acquired are complementary to the existing ones—the joint use of 
existing and acquired resources can yield a higher total value than the use of each set of resources 
independently (Sirmon, Hitt & Ireland, 2007).”10 Therefore, achieving synergy takes more than 
complementary resources, it requires a realized valuation and full exploitation of the resource. A 
streamlined focus on value creation is an incomplete understanding of the complementary 
resource’s potential performance. For their study, the authors focused on the integration of resource 
bundling “to realize the potential value of the complementarities (Pg 194).” As explained, 
“…productive performance outcomes [depend] on the extent to which management engages in 
activities that [bundle] them together within the firm’s resource portfolios (Pg 194).”  
                                                 
8 Wiklund, J., & Shepherd, D. (2009). The Effectiveness of Alliances and Acquisitions: The Role 
of Resource Combination Activities. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 33(1), 193–212. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6520.2008.00286.x 
 
9 Denrell, J., Fang, C., & Winter, S.G. (2003). The economics of strategic opportunity. Strategic 
Management Journal, 24, 977–990.  
 
10 Sirmon, D.G., Hitt, M.A., & Ireland, R.D. (2007). Managing firm resources in dynamic 
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Wiklund and Shepherd arrived at three hypotheses, whereby one demonstrates comparable 
application to the expounding research on terrorist network alliances. According to the authors, 
“The more an international firm conducts resource combination activities, the more positive the 
relationship between (a) engaging in international alliances and performance, and (b) engaging in 
international acquisitions and performance (Pg 198).” To test their hypotheses, the authors 
investigated 319 small firms and assessed their resource combination activities to ascertain the 
effectiveness of the alliances and acquisitions. In applying this theory to terrorist network research, 
Al Qaeda and ISIS are both international organizations, having multiple franchises in different 
areas throughout Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and the Maghreb. The effectiveness of their 
umbrella networks should be assessed based on how well they incorporate resource endowments 
and moderate their branch activities.  
In the “Five Principles to Business Alliances,” Hughes and Weiss outline five key aspects 
to keep in mind when aligning and merging business organizations. Their first point emphasizes 
defining the desired relationship, “focus less on defining the business plan and more on how you’ll 
work together.”11 This includes a detailed business plan and contract, deciding how the two 
organizations will interact, to better clarify the nature of the partners’ working relationship. In terms 
of collaboration, firms must know how their counterparts operate, including its organizational 
structure, policies and procedures, and cultural norms to later ensure mutual trust and respect. The 
second point explains that firms should “develop metrics pegged not only to alliance goals but also 
to alliance progress.” Frameworks for alliances should include shared goals such as, increased 
revenue, reduced costs, gains in market share, and the like. Alliance performances should also be 
                                                 
11 Hughes, Jonathan, and Jeff Weiss. “Simple Rules for Making Alliances Work.” Joint Ventures, 
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measured in terms of “ends” and “means.” The “ends” measurement indicates financial value while 
the “means” measurement includes information sharing, speed of decision making, and the 
development of new ideas. It is also essential to highlight the differing expectations and qualitative 
measures of alliance progress in monthly audits. Without measuring these pay-offs, resources such 
as time, effort, and investment may be better deployed elsewhere.  
The author’s third point suggests that, “instead of trying to eliminate differences, [firms 
should] leverage them to create value.” According to Hughes and Weiss, it takes two months to 
forget the initial organizational culture of a business practice. “Companies ally because they have 
key differences they want to leverage—different markets, customers, know-how, processes, and 
cultures.” By minimizing the conflict of highlighting differences, companies can focus on reaching 
agreements. Oftentimes conflict “arises from deep discomfort with differences and assumptions 
that the same management strategies would work with external partners.” Firms should utilize these 
unique competencies to “leverage complementary strengths and assets.” The authors also explain 
that firms can sometimes be indecisive “bureaucratic dinosaurs,” upsetting more “nimble” 
operational types. Although these behavioral differences can become incompetent and 
untrustworthy, once these firms acknowledge their areas of strength and weakness, they can 
effectively respect their differences in a power-sharing structure. Moreover, firms should “go 
beyond formal governance structures to encourage collaborative behavior.” By nurturing and 
fostering collaborative behavior throughout the chain of command, firms can promote equal 
accountability, whereby the firms “develop dispassionate analysis of how both parties contributed 
to problems that arise in the interdependent relationship.”  
Lastly, the authors explain that “companies are not monolithic, yet alliance advice tends to 
gloss over this basic reality and treat partners as if they were simple, homogeneous entities.” The 
largest barriers to effective alliances include, “mixed messages, broken commitments, and 
13
Pergher: Till Death Do Us Part: the Rivalry between ISIS and Al Qaeda?
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2018
 Pergher 14 
unpredictable, inconsistent behavior from different segments of a partner organization.” Firms 
should devote time to understanding their counterpart’s business culture and “defining the rules of 
engagement for guided interactions.” Additionally, firms must ensure that different branches don’t 
have varying levels of willingness to invest and cooperate with the counterpart.  In an example, the 
authors discovered that most executives negotiate firm alliances but “true buy-in from other parts 
of the enterprise had never been secured.”  
In referencing, “Five Principles to Business Alliances,” it is important to keep in mind, that 
both ISIS and Al Qaeda have different bureaucratic structures, which initially ignited their split. 
While Al Qaeda is more of a “bureaucratic dinosaur,” calculably planning and weighing the pros 
and cons of ‘spectaculars,’ ISIS appears to be nimbler with its usage of ‘lone-wolf’ attackers. This 
represents a difference in strategy that would have to be considered in terms of creating a power-
sharing structure.  
 
Partnerships and Mergers  
In “Approaching Merger: The Converging Public Policy Agendas of the AFL and CIO, 
1938–1955,” Cornfield and McCammon assess the eventual merging of the AFL and CIO despite 
initial apprehension on both sides. The Labor federation was known for promoting its broad public 
policy agenda on social welfare, labor law, employment policy, international trade, public 
education and other public policies in federal and state legislatures. Both federations subscribed to 
these public policy objectives before the merger, as evidenced in the wide-ranging resolution 
introduced at their conventions. “Thus, the merger was expected to concentrate, rather than to 
disperse, efforts in support of favorable legislation (Bloch 1956).”12 The authors argue that the 
                                                 
12 Bloch, Joseph. 1956. “Founding Convention of the AFL-CIO.” Monthly Labor Review 79: 147 
– 48 
14
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2018], Iss. 2, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss2/8
 Pergher 15 
combined working unity of the groups was achieved due to the initial “ideological congruence 
between movement organizations (Maney 2000).”13 Moreover, “for coordinated action to occur, 
groups must have a certain degree of overlapping interests, goals, and core beliefs (Pg 80).”14  
As Steven Barkan explains in his 1986 Civil Rights Movement study, “groups with 
pronounced disagreements over policy goals will rarely come together and work jointly to achieve 
social change.”15 Interestingly enough, before the eventual merging of the AFL and CIO, the two 
parties had incomparable differences in organizational structure that led to unsuccessful partnership 
efforts. “In the years before the 1950s, conflicts between the AFL and CIO over organizational 
philosophy, union jurisdictions, membership recruitment, and public policy goals, as well as 
personality conflicts among labor leaders, led to several abortive merger efforts (Seidman 1956).”16 
By studying the agenda from organizational conferences, Cornfield and McCammon found that, 
“…a shift in the ideological orientation of one of the groups that entailed a broadening in the AFL’s 
policy agenda and its widening embrace of the emerging New Deal welfare state set the stage for 
organizational merger (Pg 81).” In layman’s terms, the AFL widened its policy agenda to pave a 
path for the CIO’s shift in ideological orientation. Moreover, the authors discovered that prior to 
                                                 
 
13 Maney, Gregory M. 2000. “Transnational Mobilization and Civil Rights in Northern Ireland.” 
Social Problems 47: 153–179.  
 
14 Cornfield, D. (2010). Approaching Merger: The Converging Public Policy Agendas of the AFL 
and CIO, 1938–1955. In McCammon H. & Van Dyke N. (Eds.), Strategic Alliances: Coalition 
Building and Social Movements_x000B_ (pp. 79-98). University of Minnesota Press. Retrieved 
from http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.cttttdjf.8 
 
15  Barkan, Steven E. 1986. “Interorganizational Conflict in the Southern Civil Rights 
Movement.” Sociological Inquiry 56:190-209. 
 
16 Seidman, Joel. 1956. “Efforts toward Merger, 1935–1955.” Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review 9: 353–70.  
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the merger, the AFL had been increasingly criticized for its lack of aggressive organizing and less 
inclusive model, in comparison to the CIO’s “industrial unionism, in which all production workers 
of a single industry, regardless of occupation and skill level, belonged to one union (Pg 81).” It 
appears that years of insurgency within the AFL’s structure led to the eventual merging of the 
separate groups in 1955. During the period of tension that lasted from 1938 to 1955, the legislative 
goals of both the AFL and CIO had increasingly coincided. Overall, “the growing convergence in 
the public policy goals of the two federations resulted mainly from a broadening of the range of 
public policy domains of interest to the AFL (Pg 87).” 
 In assessing this source for its application to the terrorist alliance framework, there exists a 
connection between organizational structures, combined working unity, and ideological 
congruence, to determine the merging of ISIS and Al Qaeda. When comparing ISIS to Al Qaeda, 
it appears that one may have to relinquish its bureaucratic structure and less nimble approach to 
provide for acquisition of the other unless coinciding goals are identified.  
 
Militant Group Case Studies 
 
The HuJI & HuM Militant Groups  
According to Dr. Haykel, despite the recent loss of territory, "reuniting would mean that IS 
members have to give up on the idea of the caliphate." However, after consulting various case 
studies, it appears that militant groups capriciously end and mend their relationships, proposing a 
deviation from the pragmatism suggested by the business alliance literature. Upon completing a 
case study for the HuJI and HuM militant groups of Pakistan, Khurshchev Singh’s article, “HuJI 
in India: An Assessment,” explained that the mujahideen forces were “created by the United States 
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and Pakistan to fight against the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan during 1979–1989 (Pg 182).”17 
In 1985, the Harkat-ul-Jihadi Islami or HuJI splintered into two groups, the HuJI and the Harkat-
ul-Mujahideen (HuM), led by Fazlur Rehman Khalil. After Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the HuM’s 
predominant focus was on annexation of the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) regions, aligning with the 
radical Deobandi teachings of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, which advocates for a strong pan-Islamic 
ideology in India.18 In 1993, Pakistani General, Pervez Musharraf helped to unite HuM and HuJI, 
forming the Harkat-ul-Ansar or HuA. “While HuM was fully involved in terrorist attacks in J&K, 
the HuJI was not that active,” causing their eventual split again, in 1997.19 Additionally, multiple 
subgroups were formed as different networks and recruits were identified in various areas across 
Southeast Asia. By 1992, “HuJI-B” or the Bangladeshi subgroup was supported by the efforts of 
Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Al Qaeda under the leadership of Osama bin Laden. 
Subsequent to Farooq Kashmiri assuming leadership of the HuM in February of 2000, former 
members established an off-shoot group, Jaish-e-Muhammad, led by Maulana Masood Azhar (see 
figure 4). According to Peter Chalk, an expert on terrorism at the RAND  Corporation, “although 
these groups remain organizationally distinct and exhibit subtle ideological and theological 
differences, they are characterized by an overlapping membership that variously reflects personal 
                                                 
17 Khurshchev Singh, T. (2009). HuJI in India: An Assessment. Strategic Analysis, 33(2), 182–
190. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700160802518510 
 
18 “Backgrounder: Harakat-ul-Mujahideen,” Institute for Conflict Management, http:// 
www/Seagreen\maind\Web\India\J&K\TerroristOutfits.htm (as of March 2019); U.S. Department 
of State (2002b), pp. 93–94.  
 
19 Khurshchev Singh, T. (2008, February 13). HuJI after the Death of its India Chief. Retrieved 
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ties, a common anti-Indian agenda, and shared experiences in overseas militant training camps.”20 
In addition to being offshoots, various external groups, including the “LeT, JeM, and HuM – have 
been directly linked to bin Laden’s transnational terror network.”21  
In terms of goals and operations, Khurshchev Singh explains that because the group has 
various subunits in different countries, multiple objectives and activities have been identified. 
Although the HuJI was initially created to serve Afghan mujahideen camps during the Soviet-
Afghan War; today, their general mission is to provide defense for Muslims, spread destabilizing 
terrorism, and wage jihad in captured territories with the hopes of establishing Islamic rule.  While 
their various outfits differ in operation within their respective locations, HuJI –Pakistan, HuJI-
Bangladesh and India, don’t appear to clash in their general objectives, as they are operating from 
separate locations. Moreover, although the various subgroups have well-developed networks and 
donors, they do not look to outbid each other. This is unlike the competitive behavior of the ISIS-
Al Qaeda relationship, which has been witnessed within the scholarly community and previously 
mentioned by Dr. Haykel.  
 
Símon Bolívar’s CGSB and Member Guerrilla Groups: FARC, ELN, and EPL  
The Armed Forces of the Columbian Revolution or FARC originally formed in 1966 as a 
communist consolidation of proletariat defense militia, who’s groups dated back to the prior 
decade.  FARC-dominated territory became known as an “independent republic,” under President 
                                                 
20 Chalk, Peter, and Chris Fair, “Laskar-e-Taiba: At the Vanguard of the Kashmiri Insurgency,” 
Jane’s Intelligence Review, November 2002.  
 
21 Rabasa, Angel, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, Sara A. Daly, Heather S. Gregg, Theodore W. 
Karasik, Kevin A. O'Brien, and William Rosenau, Beyond al-Qaeda: Part 1, The Global Jihadist 
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Guillermo León Valencia, who coined the term “Tirofijo,” to describe the rogue state that was 
predominantly “neglected by the national government and plagued by general lawlessness.”22 
During La Violencia, the Colombian Civil War that waged between the conservative and liberal 
parties between 1948 and 1958, the FARC strengthened its ties with the Marxist-led Communist 
Party based on its disillusionment with the liberal party. Due to the deliquesce of the Soviet Union, 
the FARC received a major truncation in its financing. Moreover, its reliance on Marxism provoked 
a rather anachronistic reputation. Therefore, the FARC began to rely heavily on the guerrilla 
warfare tactics of kidnapping for ransom, receiving protection rents for illegal drug development, 
and extorting businesses. As Harvey F. Kline explains in “Chronicle of a Failure Foretold: The 
Peace Process of Colombian President Andrés Pastrana,” this strategy merely funded the militant 
group’s efforts and expansion; however, it “did not win them new sympathizers (Pg 11).”  
The promotion of FARC’s Marxist ideology lost touch with public support as the U.S. 
government increased its sponsorship of the Colombian military, however, this did not damper it’s 
enlargement of territory and recruitment. FARC began attacking soft targets, “engaging in actions 
that harmed civilians, such as land mines and the notoriously inaccurate gas-cylinder bombs, 
hijacking commercial jets, assassinating elected officials, murdering peace activists, and attacking 
an upscale family recreation center in the heart of Bogotá.” Moreover, at its zenith, FARC drew in 
a profit of approximately $600 million from its illegal drug trade, kidnappings, and extortion 
schemes.23  
                                                 
22 Turner, K. (2008). Chronicle of a Failure Foretold: The Peace Process of Colombian President 
Andrés Pastrana ‐ by Harvey F. Kline. Bulletin of Latin American Research, 27(4), 591–592. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1470-9856.2008.00286_11.x 
 
23 The Guerrilla Groups in Colombia. (n.d.). Retrieved March 21, 2019, from 
https://www.unric.org/en/colombia/27013-the-guerrilla-groups-in-colombia 
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When the Army of National Liberation or ELN was officially formed in 1964 by a group 
of left-wing radical Catholic students, they were inspired by Marxist ideology and the Cuban 
Revolution. The ELN included a democratic approach to structure, instituting operational meetings 
to elect position-holders. Initially ELN refrained from interfering with the drug trade but after 
witnessing its lucrative value, the ELN began engaging in kidnappings and the pilfering of oil 
pipelines. “Some of the group asked for and obtained military training and began a series of 
discussions about a foco (focus) strategy for Colombia.”24 Moreover, the ELN focused on targeting 
the coal and oil sector through its kidnapping and extortion stratagem. In the 1990’s, ELN suffered 
from a loss in territory due to increased governmental security. Additionally, U.S. interference in 
the Colombian military and investment of its energy sector impacted the ELN’s funding and 
recruitment.      
The Ejército popular de Liberación (EPL, Popular Liberation Army) was established in 
1967 as an armed and Mao-influenced subsect of the Colombian Communist Party. Akin to the 
ELN, the EPL also operated out of Santander, “an area of the country traditionally affected by 
disputes over land between landless campesinos and large landowners,” rendering it vulnerable to 
extortion.25 By the 1970’s the EPL utilized kidnapping and extortion efforts to finance its militant 
endeavors. Within the same decade, the M-19 was formed by recusants dismissed by the 
Communist Party and the FARC. Although the M-19 was initially considered a subsidiary urban 
guerrilla group, its kidnaping and murder of the national labor federation’s leader in 1976 
established its claim to fame. By 1990 both the EPL and M-19 entered into peace talks with the 
Colombian government, allowing for demobilization and disarmament. As a result of this 
                                                 
24 Kline, Chronicle of a Failure Foretold: The Peace Process of Colombian President Andrés 
Pastrana, 19. 
 
25 see previous.  
20
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2018], Iss. 2, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss2/8
 Pergher 21 
agreement, the former guerrilla groups became legal political parties. The M-19 became the 
Alianza Democrática M-19 and the EPL became Esperanza, Paz y Libertad, although a minority 
of its members maintained militancy.  
Under President Belisario Betancur in 1984, a Peace Commission was formed to address 
the guerrilla group activity. According to Kline, Betancur believed involvement in guerrilla groups 
was “the product of objective circumstances of poverty, injustice, and the lack of opportunities for 
political participation (Pg 17).” Although Betancur reached an agreement between the FARC and 
EPL, the ELN had not signed the peace treaty.26 The next year, in 1985, “the peace was punctuated 
by breaches of the ceasefire committed by both sides.”27 In 1987, subsequent attempts by the 
government under then-President Barco had failed to reach an agreement that would result in the 
disarming and dissolving of the militant groups. Under President César Gaviria, the FARC, ELN, 
and EPL “entered a coalition through a Coordinadora guerrillera Símon Bolívar (CGSB, Simon 
Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinator) in 1987.”28 The CGSB banded together within the same Communist 
agenda, operating within Colombia to attack lucrative oil rigs.”29 The coalition mainly formed 
based off akin doctrine and the collective objective of expanding monetarized and militarized 
support. Moreover, the groups stem from the same recruitment of the rural poor to combat 
                                                 
26 Ana María Bejarano, “Estrategias de paz y apertura democrática: Un balance de las 
administraciones Betancur y Barco,” in Francisco Leal Buitrago and León Zamosc (eds.), Al filo 
del caos: crisis política en la Colombia de los años 80 (Bogotá: Tercer Mundo Editores, 1990), 
Pg. 66. 
 




28 Kline, Chronicle of a Failure Foretold: The Peace Process of Colombian President Andrés 
Pastrana, 19. 
 
29 see note 23.  
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Colombia’s wealthy class and oppose U.S. influence. It’s important to keep in mind that the FARC, 
ELN, and EPL formed relatively around the same time period of the 1960’s with a fundamental 
Communist agenda. While the ELN was more politically motivated and ideologically focused due 
to its founding by Catholic students, the FARC initially took a more militant and guerrilla warfare 
based approach. Although the FARC is considered less unified, it does incorporate a central 
command despite having various factions due to the different operating areas.30  
In a similar fashion to Al Qaeda’s more recent subcontracting of rebel groups in homage to 
the jihadist global mission, the FARC, EPL, and ELN relied on recycling their militant recruits. 
The CGSB was an effort to consolidate the various groups under one potential power-structure. 
Had it not been for U.S. sponsorship of the Colombian military and the repeated governmental 
efforts for peace treaties, the CGSB would’ve likely have remained. However, while the global 
jihad expands over countries from Afghanistan to India, the militant groups aligned within the 
CGSB only operate in one country. However, these militant groups do form their own de facto 




Through continued communications with Defense Program Director for South Asia at the 
United States Central Command (CENTCOM), Mr. Sayyar, provided his perspective on the 
paper’s research question. In his response he agreed with Dr. Haykel that ISIS and Al Qaeda engage 
in continuous outbidding with each other for resources, making themselves more attractive to 
                                                 
30 Kline, Harvey F. Colombia: Democracy Under Assault. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995. 
State Building and Conflict Resolution in Colombia, 1986 – 1994. Tuscaloosa: University of 
Alabama Press, 1999.  
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potential donors and recruits. The groups compete to gain maximum exposure and funding. Mr. 
Sayyar believes reuniting won’t likely be an option unless ISIS was immensely desperate. He 
claims that although the physical caliphate is in the process of its eradication, the mental and more 
virtual platform is one that’s still very much present. Upon acknowledging the aforementioned 
business alliance literature, Mr. Sayyar argued that “mergers tend to happen when survival is more 
important than growth and for ISIS, it’s not there yet.” Therefore, the research findings now beg 
the question: has ISIS been defeated enough to concede and join forces with Al Qaeda, similar to 
the amalgamation between the AFL and CIO?  
Through careful inspection of the literature, it appears that the business alliance framework 
relevantly compares the intertwining networks and motivations of terrorist organizations. The 
contention lies within the party coalition literature, which suggests that groups of similar cultural 
background would be most compatible for a potential merger.  Although ISIS and Al Qaeda are 
predominantly Sunni organizations, they’ve previously targeted operatives on both sides, 
potentially damaging the grounds for a working relationship. In accordance with the partnership 
and merger literature, organizations with converging ideologies are more likely to coalesce; 
however, ISIS and Al Qaeda still differ in their goals, operations, and approach. While ISIS prefers 
brutally terrorizing civilians to amass territory for an Islamic caliphate, Al Qaeda prefers to play 




In conclusion, while Al Qaeda utilizes its calculable operational planning cycle to 
effectively engage in offensive attacks, ISIS prefers on-ground, brutal warfare tactics to amass 
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territories.  This diverging operational structure, paired with a failure to coincide ideological goals, 
maintains that the two terrorist organizations will not likely unite. In the example of the HuJI off-
shoots from Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh, these groups do not compete as they are operating 
and recruiting from separate locations. In a similar fashion, the FARC and ELN did not compete 
despite their fundamental communist agenda because they recruited members from different socio-
economic classes. While the FARC recruited destressed campesinos from the rural parts of 
Colombia, the ELN focused on urban, educated dwellers. Moreover, the CGSB was able to 
converge these akin doctrines under a centralized power-structure due to this initial lack of 
competition. With these findings, ISIS and Al Qaeda have not converged or concentrated their 
ideological goals to prepare for merger. They continue to outbid each other for resources, funding, 
and sponsors, provided by supporters of the jihadist global movement within the Gulf states. 
Furthermore, their continued rivalry in recruitment of militants, suggests that assets and 
infrastructure within the terrorist network are dwindling due to an increased crackdown on jihadi 
franchises.  
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Figure 1.  
The Islamic Caliphate  
Courtesy of CNN 
 
 
Figure 2.  
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (left) and Osama bin Laden (right) 
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Figure 3.  
Al Qaeda’s Network of affiliates and subcontractors 
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Figure 4.  
Al Qaeda’s South and Central Asian Clusters  
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